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I N T R O D U C T I O N :  S P I N O Z A ,
T H E  L I T E R A T U R E  O F  W E I M A R  C L A S S I C I S M ,
A N D  H O W  E L I O T  D I S T I N G U I S H E S
M O R A L I T Y  F R O M  I D E O L O G Y
 
This article focuses on how George Eliot distinguishes morality from
the practices of  exclusion that characterize the workings of  ideology.
Eliot’s critique of  ideology emerges from her reading of  Spinoza and
the literature of  Weimar Classicism. Spinoza’s analysis of  theology as
anthropomorphism and Goethe and Herder’s attempt to develop a
new kind of  literature that comes close to the impartiality of  scientiﬁc
observation constitute the intellectual background of Eliot’s deﬁnition
of  morality. What causes Eliot’s discomfort with a possible confusion
of  the moral with the ideological? There is a striking clash between
ideology and what Lawrence Rothﬁeld has called “the ‘critical’ realism
of Balzac, Flaubert, and Eliot.”
 
1
 
 Rothﬁeld links the discourse of critical
realism to the meticulousness that characterizes the sciences.
 
2
 
 He pin-
points the emergence of  critical realism sometime “near the end of
the eighteenth century.”
 
3
 
 This is precisely the time when Goethe and
 
1. Lawrence Rothﬁeld, 
 
Vital Signs: Medical Realism in Nineteenth-Century Fiction
 
(Princeton University Press, 1992), 8.
2. Rothﬁeld focuses on the relation between realism and the discourse of  medicine.
He differentiates the ideological from the discursive as follows: “One broad difference
between ideology and discourse is that while ideological presuppositions form a part
of  a widely shared everyday knowledge, discursive assumptions are esoteric” (ibid., 18).
3. Rothﬁeld goes on to discuss this shift in literary style within the context of  a new
scientiﬁc approach: “Sometime near the end of  the eighteenth century, however, a
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Herder redeﬁned the literary along scientiﬁc lines, inﬂuenced by
Spinoza’s scientiﬁc approach toward the study of  nature.
The ﬁrst part of  this article discusses Eliot’s appreciation of  an
impartial mode of  writing that steers free of  ideological distortions
and that she associates with the literary project of  Weimar Classicism.
A second issue involved in Eliot’s critique of ideology will be discussed
in the main part of  this article. Ideology in whatever form is based on
practices of  inclusion and exclusion: ideology refers to morality in
order to justify the exclusion of  certain groups of  people from main-
stream society. By distinguishing morality from ideology, Eliot there-
fore distances morality from practices of  exclusion in general and of
the exclusion of  the Jews in particular. But she does not conﬁne her
analysis of  ideology to the ethical sphere alone. Instead, she relates
ethics to aesthetics and vice versa. Ideology is not only a moral failure;
it also produces art that distorts reality. Formally, it is realism that cri-
tiques such ﬁctions of  the real. Eliot ﬁnds in both Spinoza’s 
 
Ethics
 
 and
the literature of Weimar Classicism intellectual support for this under-
standing of  critical realism.
Finally, I consider Eliot’s artistic working through of  both Spinoza
and the literature of  Weimar Classicism. Section II analyzes the char-
acter Daniel Deronda as embodiment of  the Herderean capability to
see the world from another person’s point of  view. It is this capability
that makes him seem morally eccentric and insigniﬁcant to society at
large. Sections III and IV analyze intertextual references to two Goethe
works. It will be shown that here, too, Eliot further develops Goethe’s
distinction between morality and ideology: her allusions are to two
plays by Goethe that recognize those who have been excluded by
various ideological practices.
 
I .  T H E  L E G A C Y  O F  S P I N O Z A  A N D
T H E  “ I M M O R A L  L I T E R A T U R E ”  O F  G O E T H E
 
In the mid-1850s Eliot set out to translate Spinoza’s 
 
Ethics
 
. This trans-
lation “was ﬁnished (though it was not published) in the spring of
 
rearrangement—uneven, to be sure, and differently motivated within different national
cultures, but forcefully registered by Kant’s critiques—occurs within the hierarchy of
knowledges. Between the noumenal world of  metaphysical philosophy and the phe-
nomenal world of  the real, between the world of  forms and the empirical world, the
sciences are now understood to supervene. The sciences may not provide us with philo-
sophical or absolute knowledge, as Kant points out, but the knowledge they 
 
do
 
 provide,
although limited by deﬁnition, nevertheless qualiﬁes as the true knowledge of  the real”
(ibid., 8).
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1856.”
 
4
 
As part of his critique of Descartes’ mind-body dualism, Spinoza
questions the presumed harmony between the mind’s conception of
things and the actual constitution of  these things.
 
5
 
 Spinoza argues
that human cognition does not present an accurate account of nature.
Instead, it forms “universal ideals of natural things as much as” it does
“of  artiﬁcial ones.”
 
6
 
For an accurate understanding of  Eliot’s critique of  the alleged
immorality of Goethe’s work, it is crucial to take into account Spinoza’s
argument that mental constructs are distortions of  the real. Spinoza
discusses the difﬁculty of  separating the ﬁctional from the mentally
constructed as part and parcel of his critical inquiry into the fallacious
foundations of  certain moral propositions. He argues that the idea of
sin comes into being at the point at which the mind realizes how nature
diverges from cognitive models: “So when they [human minds] see
something happen in Nature which does not agree with the model
they [human minds] have conceived of  this kind of  thing, they believe
that Nature itself  has failed or sinned, and left the thing imperfect.”
 
7
 
Here then morality itself  can fall prey to ﬁctitiousness. If  it does so, it
becomes immoral, because it labels as sin or failure anything that
does not coincide with its cognitive model of  the world. In this way
morality turns discriminatory and exclusive.
Spinoza thus criticizes a morality that has turned into ideology. At
this point the moral can justify the exclusions practiced by the ideo-
logical. It is this possible confusion of  morality with the exclusionary
practices of  ideology that is a major concern within the literature of
Weimar Classicism. Eliot sees in the literature of  Weimar Classicism a
force that avoids the subjugation of  morality to ideology. Whereas an
ideological morality excludes and discriminates against certain groups
of  people, critical realism attempts to be inclusive. In her essays, Eliot
praises the literature of  Weimar Classicism for such a large and all-
inclusive perspective. The method of German classical literature is that
of  nonspecialization. As she makes clear in “The Future of  German
 
4. Tim Dolin, 
 
George Eliot
 
 (Oxford University Press, 2005), 27.
5. Spinoza’s questioning of Descartes’ mind-body divide has a realist agenda: the mind
cannot exist without its empirical, corporeal foundation, and so Spinoza calls the mind
the idea of  the body. According to Rothﬁeld, this interdependence between conscious-
ness and corporeality also marks the literature of  critical realism: “Consciousness in
realism always inhabits a body that serves as an empirical grounding-point, the site at
which death occurs and the truth emerges, like the inky ﬂuid spewing forth from Emma’s
mouth after she has killed herself” (Rothﬁeld, 
 
Vital Signs
 
, 166).
6. Benedictus de Spinoza, 
 
Ethics
 
, ed. and trans. Edwin Curley, with an introduction
by Stuart Hampshire (London: Penguin, 1996), 114.
7. Ibid.
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Philosophy,” “Lessing, Herder, Goethe, and Schiller . . . were produc-
tive in several departments.”
 
8
 
 She goes on to highlight the creative
potential of  such a nonexclusive approach: “Those who decry versa-
tility—and there are many who do so in other countries besides
Germany—seem to forget the immense service rendered by the 
 
sugges-
tiveness
 
 of  versatile men, who come to the subject with fresh, unstrained
minds.”
 
9
 
 It is, however, not only the nonversatile, specialized scholar
(whom Eliot calls “exclusive inquirer”
 
10
 
) who has much to learn from
the literature of  Germany’s classical age. Related to the issue of  versa-
tility, as discussed in the quote above, is the literary attempt to provide
an impartial representation of  reality: Herder’s and Goethe’s works
exemplify a striving for impartiality while always being cognizant that
they cannot fully attain a completely unbiased approach. In her char-
acterization of Daniel Deronda, George Eliot illustrates Herder’s theo-
retical work on versatility as empathy with the oblique, the neglected,
and the almost forgotten past. Rather than concur with the judgmental
conclusions a given society has established as moral truths, Deronda
attempts to understand the life and opinions of  those who are moral
outcasts.
This attitude bears a striking resemblance to Goethe’s refusal to
spell out moral judgments, which distinguishes his literary work from
much of  the moralistic literature of  the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries. Signiﬁcantly, in her essays, Eliot defends Goethe’s novel
 
Wilhelm Meister
 
 against the charge of  constituting immoral literature.
In English society of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Goethe,
as Rosemary Ashton has pointed out, “had been chosen to stand for
the general tendency of  German literature to corrupt.”
 
11
 
 Eliot then
asks, “But is 
 
Wilhelm Meister
 
 an immoral book?”
 
12
 
 She explains that
Goethe’s lack of  moral bias does not make him an immoral writer. An
impartial approach accounts for this lack of  direct moral judgment,
and itself  produces a text capable of  gripping the reader’s attention:
“As long as you keep to an apparently impartial narrative of  facts you
will have earnest eyes ﬁxed on you in rapt attention, but no sooner
do you begin to betray symptoms of  an intention to moralise, or to
 
8. George Eliot, “The Future of  German Philosophy,” in 
 
The Essays of George Eliot
 
,
ed. Thomas Pinney (London: Routledge, 1963), 149.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid.
11. Rosemary Ashton, 
 
The German Idea: Four English Writers and the Reception of German
Thought, 1800–1860
 
 (Cambridge University Press, 1980), 148.
12. George Eliot, “The Morality of  Wilhelm Meister,” in Pinney, 
 
Essays of George
Eliot
 
, 144.
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turn the current of  facts towards a personal application, than the
interest of  your hearer will slacken, his eyes will wander, and the
moral dose will be doubly distasteful from the very sweet-meat in
which you have attempted to insinuate it.”
 
13
 
 And yet, Eliot acknowl-
edges that a state of impartiality can never be fully reached. The writer
who aims at a nonbiased representation of  characters thus composes
“an apparently impartial narrative.” Impartiality has, therefore, an
impact on literary style.
What, however, are the implications of an impartial literary style for
an accurate understanding of  the immorality inherent in harsh moral
judgments? Literature that sets out to present narratives in an impartial
and realistic mode enables its readers to learn from particulars rather
than abstractions. Eliot clearly attributes greater pedagogical potential
to an attention to anthropological particularity than to the generality
of  moral rules: “But a few are taught by their own falls and their own
struggles, by their experience of  sympathy, and help and goodness in
the ‘publicans and sinners’ of these modern days, that the line between
the virtuous and the vicious, so far from being a necessary safeguard
to morality, is itself  an immoral ﬁction.”
 
14
 
 Here she contrasts the
existential (“their own falls and their own struggles”) with the cogni-
tively constructed (“the line between the virtuous and the vicious”).
She differentiates between actions and the moralistic meaning that is
imposed upon them. The gulf  that separates the existential (the realm
of  actions and nature’s causality) from the cognitive construction of
meaning gives rise to anthropomorphic ﬁction, a phenomenon Spinoza
analyzed in his 
 
Ethics
 
.
 
15
 
 These anthropomorphic ﬁctions are ideological
because they serve to justify discriminations against certain groups of
people. For example, according to Spinoza anthropomorphism depicts
God as someone who wages war against certain communities in the
same way in which human societies do.
In her essay on 
 
Wilhelm Meister
 
, Eliot takes forward Spinoza’s critique
of  anthropomorphism when she focuses on the exclusionary force of
moral judgments. She appreciates the Spinozist heritage by way of
Goethe’s work. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries Spinoza
was commonly identiﬁed as the prime cause responsible for the pre-
sumed immorality of  Goethe’s writings. In fact, the famous Spinoza
controversy was triggered by Lessing’s enthusiasm for Goethe’s poem
 
13. Ibid., 145.
14. Ibid., 147.
15. For a detailed discussion of  this point, see Michael Mack, “Spinoza’s Non-
hierarchical Vision,” forthcoming in 
 
Telos
 
.
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“Prometheus.”
 
16
 
 An espousal of  Goethe’s work thus testiﬁed to one’s
Spinozist afﬁliations. In what ways did Goethe’s 
 
Wilhelm Meister
 
 in
particular and the literature of  Weimar Classicism in general inform
the conception of  
 
Daniel Deronda
 
? As Marc E. Wohlfarth has pointed
out, Eliot composed her last novel in the form of the Bildungsroman.
 
17
 
It thus of  course deﬁnes itself  in relation to 
 
Wilhelm Meister
 
, the locus
classicus of this generic type. Most important, the theme of nationalism
as discussed in 
 
Daniel Deronda
 
 has its historical and intellectual point
of  reference in the writer, poet, theologian, and cultural critic Johann
Gottfried Herder. Herder was the ﬁrst to make the case for the national
independence of  ethnic groups that were oppressed by imperial rule.
His work was thus the driving force behind Eastern European and
Jewish strivings to recuperate a national identity. Saleel Nurbhai and
K. M. Newton have recently shown that the “form of  nationalism
favored by Eliot was of an anti-imperialist nature. It was associated with
the desire to replace domination with self-determination—a similar
motivation to that which provoked the struggles of the working classes
and which could be interpreted in kabbalistic terms as the golems’
search for self-awareness.”
 
18
 
 The reference to the kabbalah and to the
golem might well be pertinent in the present context. It is, however,
equally true that Eliot derived her speciﬁc understanding of  an anti-
imperialist nationalism from Herder’s cultural theory. In an important
study Bernard Semmel has thus traced Eliot’s support of  “cultural
pluralism” to the “eighteenth-century German historian whom she
referred to as ‘the great Herder’ [Eliot to Mr. and Mrs. Charles Bray
and Sara Hennell, August 5, 1849].”
 
19
 
16. See Gérard Vallée, 
 
The Spinoza Conversations between Lessing and Jacobi: Text with
Excerpts from the Ensuing Controversy
 
 (Lanham, MD: University Press of  America, 1988).
17. See Marc E. Wohlfarth, “
 
Daniel Deronda
 
 and the Politics of  Nationalism,”
 
Nineteenth-Century Literature
 
 53 (1998): 192.
18. Saleel Nurbhai and K. M. Newton, 
 
George Eliot, Judaism, and the Novels: Jewish
Myth and Mysticism
 
 (New York: Palgrave, 2002), 153.
19. Bernard Semmel, 
 
George Eliot and the Politics of National Inheritance
 
 (Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 1994), 13. Semmel goes on to characterize Herder as “a cultural nationalist
and a pluralist who delighted in the interplay of  environment, historical period, and
national character that produced the poetry, the music, the art, the politics, and the
society that were inherent in the nature and development of  the profoundly different
national organisms” (ibid.). The general relevance of Herder’s anti-imperialist approach
to diverse national communities has also been noted by Hao Li in his discussion of
 
Daniel Deronda
 
: “The cultural concept of  nationalism is largely derived from Herder’s
idea of 
 
Volksgeist
 
 which stands for a natural, spontaneous and non-political tradition. . . .
Eliot thus resembles Herder in attitude. . . . This emphasis on cultural traits deﬁnes the
oft-noted unwavering belief  in cultural ‘separateness with communication’ (
 
DD
 
, 60:673)
in 
 
Daniel Deronda
 
” (Li, 
 
Memory and History in George Eliot: Transﬁguring the Past
 
 [Basing-
stoke: Macmillan, 2000], 156–57).
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A signiﬁcant upshot of  Herder’s and Goethe’s study of  Spinoza is
their respective appreciation of diversity in human and natural history.
The textual and thematic references in 
 
Daniel Deronda
 
 to writers and
works of  Weimar Classicism thus have as their focal point the legacy
of Spinoza’s writing and thought. The novel’s narrative voice associates
the ﬁgure of  Mordecai with that of  Spinoza. Both live on the margins
of  society: the “consumptive-looking Jew, apparently a fervid student
of  some kind, getting his crust by quiet handicraft”
 
20
 
 resembles in
his lifestyle the seventeenth century philosopher Spinoza (he is “like
Spinoza” [472]). The two intellectuals share a voluntary afﬁliation
with the poor and other social outcasts.
Mordecai’s historical consciousness, however, opens up a gulf  that
distinguishes his thought from that of  the seventeenth-century philos-
opher. In his slightly dismissive approach toward history and lan-
guage, Spinoza clearly clings to Descartes’ ideal of  scientiﬁc inquiry.
His 
 
Theological-Political Treatise
 
 sharply differentiates between philo-
sophical truth and the unreliability of  historical knowledge: “Again,”
he emphasizes, “philosophy rests on the basis of  universally valid
axioms, and must be constructed by studying Nature alone, whereas
faith is based on history and language.”
 
21
 
 As George Levine has pointed
out, with Mordecai, by contrast, Eliot acknowledges “the connection
between science and what appears to be mysticism.”
 
22
 
 The Spinozist
thought of Goethe’s and Herder’s works ﬁlls this gap that separates the
end of  the seventeenth from the middle of  the nineteenth century.
The relationship between Charles Darwin’s scientiﬁc inquiry and
Eliot’s literary work is pertinent to this discussion. As Gillian Beer has
shown, Darwin set the tone for Victorian scientiﬁc inquiry precisely
by unfolding his explorations through a deliberately unstable,
mythic, and poetic linguistic register. He presents his thought in the
multivalence of  metaphor and in what Gillian Beer has called “an
imaginative reordering of  experience.”
 
23
 
 What precisely characterizes
 
20. George Eliot, 
 
Daniel Deronda
 
, ed. Terence Cave (London: Penguin, 1995), 471–72.
Page numbers from this edition hereafter cited parenthetically in text.
21. Benedictus de Spinoza, 
 
Theological-Political Treatise
 
, trans. Samuel Shirley, with
introduction and notes by Seymour Feldman (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1998), 169.
22. George Levine, “George Eliot’s Hypothesis of  Reality,” 
 
Nineteenth-Century Litera-
ture
 
 35 (1980): 19.
23. As Beer has put it, “The form of  Darwin’s sentence is often optative, ‘we may,’
not absolute. . . . The ‘great facts’ which Darwin perceived were expressed through a
profusion of  metaphor; they demanded an imaginative reordering of  experience. 
 
The
Origin of Species
 
 was itself  a work which could only too readily be cast by its critics as
speculative and utopian, fascinated with its own ethnography in the style of  Utopias
from Thomas More on” (Gillian Beer, 
 
Darwin’s Plot: Evolutionary Narrative in Darwin,
George Eliot, and Nineteenth-Century Fiction
 
 [Cambridge University Press, 2000], 95).
 
One Line Long
 Michael Mack
 
„
 
Deronda
 
 and the Literature of Weimar Classicism
 
673
 
the poetic and speculative element of  Darwin’s writing and thought?
Here too Spinoza’s philosophy of  nature was inﬂuential. Darwin re-
ceived Spinoza’s idea through the mediation of the literature of Weimar
Classicism (that of Goethe in particular, whose work incorporates both
ﬁction and scientiﬁc inquiry).
 
24
 
As a consequence of  his literary education, Darwin deepens and
develops Spinoza’s antiteleological and antihierarchical critique of
anthropocentrism. Gillian Beer refers to Darwin’s “copious imagina-
tion” that draws upon “the richness of  the perceptual world.”
 
25
 
 This
literary and imaginative approach furthers Darwin’s Spinozist aversion
to both hierarchical constructions and teleological explanations of
natural phenomena: “Because it refused the notion of  precedent Idea
with its concomitant assumption of  preordained Design, Darwin’s
method of description placed great emphasis upon congruities within
the multiple materiality of  the world.”
 
26 Darwin’s Spinozist refutation
of  a teleological order has serious consequences for the plot of  the
Victorian novel: “The question of  congruity between language and
physical order is evidently related to teleological issues, just as narra-
tive order brings sharply into focus the question of  precedent design.
Victorian novelists increasingly seek a role for themselves within the
language of  the text as observer and experimenter, rather than as
designer or god. Omniscience goes, omnipotence is concealed.”27 The
eclipse of  teleology gives rise to the elevation of  that which has com-
monly been demoted to insigniﬁcance in a vertical order of  things.
Spinoza attempted to make the insigniﬁcant philosophically signiﬁcant.
The exclusionary mechanisms implicit in ideology make room for a
nonideological and thus nonhierarchical understanding of  morality.
In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries Spinoza was infamous for
having pulled down the hierarchical divide between the realms of  the
transcendent (God and the mind) and the immanent (nature and
the body). Goethe and his former mentor Herder set out to adapt
this Spinozist undertaking to the changed context of  the end of  the
eighteenth and the beginning of  the nineteenth century. They took
issue with some tendencies in Enlightenment thought that condemned
both the poetic-mythic and the historical past to insigniﬁcance.
This brief  account of Spinozism and its inﬂuence on eighteenth- and
nineteenth-century literature sets the stage for the following discussion
24. For a detailed discussion of  this point, see Robert J. Richards, The Romantic Con-
ception of Life: Science and Philosophy in the Age of Goethe (University of  Chicago Press,
2002).
25. Beer, Darwin’s Plot, 73.
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid., 40.
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of  Eliot’s characterization of  Deronda as personifying the signiﬁcance
of  the insigniﬁcant. By so doing, Eliot distinguishes between morality
and practices of  exclusion that characterize the workings of  ideology.
Ultimately I will consider the so far neglected role of two Goethe works
alluded to in Daniel Deronda: Tasso and Iphegenie auf Tauris. Eliot refers
to these two plays in passages that question the exclusion of  Jews
from Victorian society. She thus refers to Goethe’s work in order to
distinguish between morality and discriminatory practices of  ideology.
I I .  H E R D E R ’ S  H I S T O R I C A L  R E A S O N  A N D  
D E R O N D A ’ S  P O E T I C S  O F  T H E  E V E R Y D A Y
As I have discussed in my 2003 book German Idealism and the Jew, im-
portant strands within Enlightenment thought tended to characterize
Jews and Judaism as insipid. Within the latter part of  the eighteenth
century, modernity was seen to demote the historical past to insignif-
icance, and the future of  humanity seemed to promise its immanent
perfectibility. I have shown how these attempts at constructing a
“perfect” otherworldly world within this one were premised on the ex-
clusion of  worldly imperfections.28 Judaism and the Jews represented
these bodily remainders of contingency and a political as well as ethical
deﬁciency: it was thought that with the progress of  history, worldly
imperfections would vanish from the world just as Jews and Judaism
would cease to exist in the perfect modern state of  the future.
Voltaire was the ﬁrst to coin the expression “philosophy of  history”
when he published the introduction to his vast historical work Essai sur
les moeurs separately under the title La Philosophie de l’Histoire (1765).
In his Essai Voltaire poked fun at Jewish history and dismissed its moral,
cultural, and historical validity.29 In response to Voltaire’s ridicule of
both Judaism and Jewishness, Herder declared that he becomes a Jew
when he reads the Old Testament. In his Letters Concerning the Study of
Theology, Herder thus contrasts his understanding of  historical reason
with Voltaire’s philosophical approach: “You see,” he addresses the
reader, “how sacred and valuable I ﬁnd these [ Jewish] books and how
much—as a response to Voltaire’s mockery—I am a Jew, when I read
them, for do we not have to be a Greek or a Roman when we read
Greeks and Romans? Each book has to be read in its contextual
28. For an in-depth discussion of this problematic, see Michael Mack, German Idealism
and the Jew: The Inner Anti-Semitism of Philosophy and German Jewish Responses (University
of  Chicago Press, 2003).
29. See Adam Suttcliffe, Judaism and Enlightenment (Cambridge University Press,
2003), 231–46.
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spirit.”30 Turning to Daniel Deronda, this mode of  historical empathy
distinguishes Deronda’s attitude toward the oblique and the foreign
from that of other representatives of English culture such as Mr. Grand-
court. As a young man Deronda implicitly subscribes to a Herderean
notion of  historical reason. His patron Sir Hugo “let him quit Cam-
bridge and pursue a more independent line of study abroad. The germs
of  this inclination had been already stirring in his boyish love of  uni-
versal history, which made him want to be at home in foreign countries,
and follow in imagination the travelling students of  the middle ages.
He longed to have the apprenticeship to life which would not shape
him too deﬁnitely, and rob him of  the choices that might come from
free growth” (180). This passage foregrounds Deronda’s Herderean
empathy with the spatially and temporally distant: he “wants to be at
home in foreign countries,” and he sets out to imitate the boundary-
crossing travel arrangements that formed a substantial part of  the
educational curriculum of  the Middle Ages. His ideal of  an interdisci-
plinary apprenticeship also evokes the notion of  Bildung that informs
Goethe’s Wilhelm Meister. Eliot, as we have seen, recommends such
nonspecialist approach in her essays (as will be discussed below).31
Ironically, Deronda discovers his identity through such apparent loss
of  selfhood. He empathizes with the despised and the oblique, and
yet this empathy makes him literarily ﬁnd himself  in the other. Eliot
dwells on his “strong tendency to side with objects of prejudice” (206).
This is not say that she unrealistically removes him from exposure to
30. “Sie sehen, mein Fr, wie heilig und hehr mir diese Bücher sind, und wie sehr ich
(nach Voltair’s Spott) ein Jude bin, wenn ich sie lese: denn müssen wir nicht Griechen
und Römer sein, wenn wir Griechen und Römer lesen? Jedes Buch muß in seinem Geiste
gelesen werden” ( Johann Gottfried von Herder, Briefed as Studium der Theologie Betreffend,
in Herders Sämmtliche Werke, vol. 10, ed. Bernhard Suphan [Berlin: Weidmannsche Buch-
handlung, 1879], 143). Goethe followed Herder’s approach as emphasized in Goethe’s
autobiography Dichtung und Wahrheit. See Goethes Werke, vol. 9, ed. Erich Trunz (Munich:
Beck, 1982), 140.
31. Here an intriguing parallel to George Eliot’s previous novel Middlemarch emerges.
Gillian Beer has astutely analyzed how Eliot’s other late novel calls into question the
scientiﬁc and social validity of  unitary forms of  life and meaning: “The typical concern
of  the intellectual characters of  the book [i.e., Middlemarch] is with visions of  unity, but
a unity which seeks to resolve the extraordinary diversities of  the world back into a
single answer; the key to all mythologies, the primitive tissue, allegorical painting
(Ladislaw mocks Naumann: ‘I do not think that all the universe is straining towards the
obscure signiﬁcance of your pictures’ [1:19:290]). Casaubon and Dorothea, for different
reasons, are distressed by the miscellaneity of  Rome, where the remains of  different
cultures are all typographically jostling each other, apparently without hierarchy of
meaning” (Beer, Darwin’s Plot, 162). Deronda’s appreciation of  the diverse thus offers
an alternative to Causabon and Lydgate’s respective quest for single origins.
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anti-Jewish sentiments. She makes clear that “Deronda could not escape
(who can?) knowing ugly stories of  Jewish characteristics and occupa-
tions; and though one of his favorite protests was against the severance
of  past and present history, he was like others who shared his protest,
in never having cared to reach any more special conclusions about
Jews than that they retained the virtues and vices of  a long oppressed
race” (206). The narrative voice of  Eliot’s last novel characterizes the
status of Judaism within Victorian society as nothing else but “as a sort
of eccentric fossilised form which an accomplished man might dispense
with studying and leave to specialists” (363). Signiﬁcantly, the higher
echelons of English society classify Deronda as someone who is socially
irrelevant, that is to say, as someone who is only of  specialist interest:
he appears an insigniﬁcant eccentric.
It is precisely Deronda’s sympathetic approach to those who do not
conform to a code of propriety that makes him seem eccentric. As the
narrator points out, “Daniel had the stamp of rarity in a subdued fervor
of  sympathy, an activity of  imagination on behalf  of  others, which did
not show itself  effusively, but was continually seen in acts of  consider-
ateness that struck his companions as moral eccentricity” (178). In a
truly versatile manner Deronda thus combines moral qualities (sym-
pathy) with the gift of the artist (imagination). For Mr. Grandcourt such
eccentricity reduces a person’s social signiﬁcance. Deronda’s lack of
status makes Gwendolen compare his position with that of Mrs. Glasher
and her children (chap. 29). What connects Deronda to Mrs. Glasher
is that they share the context of  social exclusion. Gwendolen makes
the connection:
Gwendolen, whose unquestioning habit it had been to take the best 
that came to her for less than her own claim, had now to see the 
position which tempted her in a new light, as a hard, unfair exclusion 
of  others. What she had heard about Deronda seemed to her 
imagination to throw him into one group with Mrs Glasher and her 
children; before whom she felt herself  in an attitude of  apology—she 
who had hitherto been surrounded by a group that in her opinion had 
need to be apologetic to her. Perhaps Deronda was himself  thinking 
these things. Could he know of  Mrs Glasher? (335)
Through an acquaintance with the fate of  Mrs. Glasher and her
children, Gwendolen is suddenly confronted with the dark side of
success. The passage quoted above enters into her internal dialogue
about the ambiguity of gain. Does gain have a relation to loss? Deronda
seems to ﬁgure as the conscience within her internal dispute about
the sustainability of  her path toward social and ﬁnancial success. She
seems to know the risk associated with her marriage, and yet she
marries nevertheless.
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Deronda plays such a marginal role in the “English part” of the novel
precisely because his presence is repressed: Gwendolen’s repression
of  her affection for him is symptomatic of  the way in which Deronda’s
personality does not seem to be socially acceptable. Only through this
suppression of  the knowledge of  her affection for Deronda is Gwen-
dolen able to conform to the ideology that prescribes marriage to
women as a path to social advancement. As Slavoj Zizek has pointed
out, ideology does not primarily have the function of  an illusion. On
the contrary, the ideological denotes reality: “ideology is not simply
‘false consciousness’, an illusory representation of  reality, it is rather
this reality itself  which is already to be conceived as ‘ideological—‘ideo-
logical’ is a social reality whose very existence implies the non-knowledge of
its participants as to its essence—that is, the social effectivity, the very
reproduction of  which implies that the individuals ‘do not know what
they are doing.’ ”32 Gwendolen’s sense of  reality would collapse if  she
were not to marry Grandcourt. She is not interested in Grandcourt as
an individual—in stark contrast to her real but repressed interest in
Deronda. The novel offers an extraordinarily subtle presentation, over
some three hundred pages, of  Gwendolen’s reasons for marrying
Grandcourt. This presentation focuses on her incompletely acknowl-
edged attraction to Deronda and the social pressures that make her
choose marriage as an illusory attainment of  freedom. The marriage
to Grandcourt is certainly not a romantic affair. Instead it offers the
prospect of  social respectability and ﬁnancial independence.
In her external dealings, Gwendolen has to focus on Grandcourt and
avoid Deronda. This has to be reality if  she wants to be consistent with
the demands of  the ideology that governs her society. Conversely, in
the internal dialogue (as quoted above) she focuses on Deronda. Sig-
niﬁcantly, she asks whether he might know of Mrs. Glasher. She seems
to fear knowledge. She wants to repress the relation between gain
and loss, which Deronda seems to bring to light. This knowledge of
the coincidence between failure and success preconditions Deronda’s
imaginative sympathy; for him this division within humanity does not
exist. At the end of  the novel he is not an ethnocentric nationalist,
and, as Kwame Anthony Appiah has recently pointed out, “in claiming
a Jewish loyalty—an ‘added soul’—Deronda is not rejecting a human
one.”33
What thematic and structural role does Deronda’s imaginative sym-
pathy play within the larger ambit of  the novel? Daniel Deronda has
32. Slavoj Zizek, The Sublime Object of Ideology (London: Verso, 1989), 21.
33. Kwame Anthony Appiah, Cosmopolitanism: Ethics in a World of Strangers (New York:
Norton, 2006), xvii.
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often been criticized for a lack of  compositional coherence. Deirdre
David has described the novel as “fatally, if  seductively, split, for Eliot
is unable to reconcile her ﬁne study in psychological and social realism
with the strange, difﬁcult and sometimes virtually unreadable Deronda
narrative of  Jewish identity.”34 Why does this issue of  disconnection
ﬁgure so prominently in critical discussions of  a work of  ﬁction
whose narrative strands set out to interconnect that which seems to
be disjointed? Gillian Beer has rightly taken issue with the posited
dualism of  English and Jewish society: “Indeed, to conceive of  Jews
and English entirely in dualistic terms misses the point that what
Eliot is exploring in the novel is not polarity but common sources:
the common culture, story, and genetic inheritance of  which the Jews
and the English are two particularly strongly interconnected expres-
sions, which raises questions of  transmission.”35 Yet critics tend to
allocate a binding force only to the miraculous, quasi–fairy tale nature
of  the novel: so far they have exclusively allocated this connecting
force to its Jewish strand. George Levine has thus discussed Daniel
Deronda in terms of  Eliot’s break with the previous realism of  Adam
Bede, Felix Holt, and Middlemarch. 36 He attributes this break to
Deronda’s and Mordecai’s impractical idealism.
How, though, did Eliot deﬁne realism in her preceding work? In the
famous chapter of  Adam Bede, entitled “In Which the Story Pauses a
Little,” she explains how inclusion of the oblique and the socially insig-
niﬁcant distinguishes a realistic mode of  writing from a style geared
to aesthetic rules and lofty theories: “Therefore let Art always remind
us of  them” (i.e., “old women scraping carrots with their work-worn
hands, those heavy clowns taking holiday in a dingy pot-house, those
rounded back and stupid weather-beaten faces that have bent over
the spade and done the rough work of  the world”); “therefore let us
always have men ready to give the loving pains of  a life to the faithful
representing of  commonplace things—men who see beauty in these
34. Deirdre David, Fictions of Resolution in Three Victorian Novels: “North and South,”
“Our Mutual Friend,” “Daniel Deronda,” (London: Macmillan, 1981), 135.
35. Beer, Darwin’s Plot, 182.
36. Levine discusses this break with realism in relation to Middlemarch as follows:
“Had Dorothea responded with Celia’s revulsion from Casaubon’s hairy mole, and
with Mrs. Cadwallader’s sensible alertness to the disparity of  age, she would never have
imagined Casaubon as Milton. But in Daniel Deronda common sense, like common life,
is essentially a danger and a distortion. The world of  the realistic novel is irrevocably in
fragments—the church turned stable, the American Civil War commenting on Gwen-
dolen’s egoistic concerns, family ties shattered, English culture a mere façade of  wealth
and aristocracy” (Levine, “George Eliot’s Hypothesis,” 18).
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commonplace things, and delight in showing how kindly the light of
heaven falls on them.”37 Her realist mode of  writing, thus, defamiliar-
izes what has become familiar. It endows the everyday with an aura of
the miraculous. In this approach Eliot subscribes to a nonutilitarian
understanding of the factual, an element common to Victorian writing
and thought.38
According to Eliot, realism discovers the signiﬁcance of  the seem-
ingly insigniﬁcant. It brings to the fore the aesthetic (“beauty in these
commonplace things”) and the spiritual (“delight in showing how kindly
the light of  heaven falls on them”) quality of  commonplace things.
This is, however, precisely Daniel Deronda’s approach.39 The narrative
voice of Eliot’s last novel evokes the famous chapter on realism in Adam
Bede when it describes Daniel as neither romantic nor empiricist: “To
say that Deronda was romantic would be to misrepresent him; but
under his calm and somewhat self-repressed exterior there was a
fervor which made him easily ﬁnd poetry and romance among the
events of everyday life” (205). I believe that Deronda’s poetics of every-
day life establishes a connective thread between the Jewish and the
English strands of  the novel.
In order to address this issue, it is necessary to look at the opening
chapter where Daniel seems to cast an ironic gaze on Gwendolen who
is enthralled by her pursuit of  gain while gambling. To him, who sees
37. George Eliot, Adam Bede, with an introduction by Leonee Ormond (London:
Everyman, 1996), 201.
38. Beer has pointed out how this romantic type of  materialism characterizes both
Darwin’s science and late nineteenth-century literature: “In the process of  Darwin’s
thought, one movement is constantly repeated: the impulse to substantiate metaphor and
particularly to ﬁnd a real place for older mythological expressions. He has an almost
equal satisfaction in alerting us to the mysterious in fact (and here we can see the in-
ﬂuence of  Carlyle, whose prodigious linguistic energy goes into recuperating the past
and reviving the marvel of the everyday). The grotesque, the beautiful and the wonderful
in the everyday was a major Victorian imaginative theme” (Beer, Darwin’s Plot, 74).
39. The appreciation of insigniﬁcance has a point of reference in both various Jewish
and Christian sources. In this respect E. S. Shaffer has analyzed Daniel Deronda as a
Jesus ﬁgure. She makes it clear that Eliot stands in stark contrast to the institutional
interpretation of  Jesus. As Shaffer emphasizes, Eliot takes into account the historical
critical perspective of  Friedrich Strauss and others: “Strauss and Feuerbach are equally
important here, Strauss in understanding religious experience as myth, Feuerbach in
understanding the unity of man to reside not in the solitary ego but in the species being,
in the sexual man and woman taken as one. Renan is important too, but in the negative
sense that his early life of  Jesus is corrected and rewritten in accordance with a deeper
grasp of  the principles of  the higher criticism and a novelist’s power of  searching out
the intricacies of  mutual dependence” (Shaffer, “Kubla Khan” and the Fall of Jerusalem:
The Mythological School in Biblical Criticism and Secular Literature, 1770–1880 [Cambridge
University Press, 1975], 181).
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poetry in everyday life, the exorbitant commercial glamour of  the
Leubronn casino appears to be “dull” (9). Alluding to this opening
scene of  the novel, Gwendolen will later justify her passion for gam-
bling by saying that it “is a refuge from dulness [sic],” to which Daniel
responds that “what we call the dulness of  things is a disease in our-
selves” (411). What causes this disease that makes the commonplace
appear to be dull and insigniﬁcant? Gwendolen’s passion for gambling
has a striking relation to the presence of market economic transactions.
Gambling and the market economy are driven by a desire for gain. The
notion of  “gain” relies on the existence of  its opposite, namely, “loss.”
This binary opposition between gain and loss shapes a hierarchical
division that separates the valuable from the valueless, the signiﬁcant
from the insigniﬁcant. Deronda’s openness to the poetry within the
realism of the everyday confounds various economic, ethnic, and social
hierarchies. Those who differentiate between loss and gain subscribe
to a judgmental way of  thinking. Deronda’s “keenly perceptive sym-
pathetic emotiveness,” which does not go without a “speculative ten-
dency” (496), refrains from judging human life according to a gain-loss
equation. On the contrary, “what he felt was a profound sensibility to
a cry from the depth of  another soul; and accompanying that, the
summons to be receptive instead of  superciliously prejudging” (496).
Deronda’s receptiveness may have roots in Herder’s understanding of
reason as a historical as well as an anthropological sensitivity. Eliot’s
depiction of  Deronda’s “profound sensibility to a cry from the depth
of  another soul” is inﬂuenced by Herder’s conception of  empathy as
the capacity to feel oneself  into ( fühle dich hinein) the psychic position
of  someone else.40 Rational inquiry presupposes the capacity to put
oneself  into the place of  another, across the divides that separate the
present from the past and the culturally distant from the familiar.
Herder deﬁnes reason as the ability to listen: Vernunft (reason) is Ver-
nehmen (to receive, to listen). Deronda’s receptivity to the oblique, the
despised, and the historical past in fact offers an intriguing illustration
of  Herder’s understanding of  reason as active listening.41 Deronda
does not conﬁne history to the realm of the dead. Instead, he engages
in a conversation with the almost forgotten past and thereby discovers
his identity. He thinks “himself  imaginatively into the experience of
40. Johann Gottfried von Herder does so in This Too a Philosophy of History, in his
Werke: Band 1 Herder und der Sturm und Drang, 1764–1774, ed. Wolfgang Pross (Munich:
Hanser, 1984), 612.
41. See Johann Gottfried von Herder, Werke: Band III/1 Ideen zur Philosophie der
Geschichte der Menschheit, ed. Wolfgang Pross (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesell-
schaft, 2002), 133.
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others” (511). This receptive quality bridges temporal as well as geo-
graphical and cultural divisions. It presupposes the collapse of  hier-
archical rankings and ideological exclusions.
I I I .  T H E  I N T E R T E X T U A L I T Y  O F
T H E  TA S S O  M O T I V E
Critics have so far paid little attention to various intertextual references
to the literature of Weimar Classicism in Eliot’s last novel.42 This article
offers the ﬁrst detailed analysis of  allusions in Daniel Deronda to two
plays that Goethe composed during his Weimar period. And a critique
of  hierarchical rankings and ideological exclusions lies at the heart of
various allusions to two Goethe works in Daniel Deronda.
This section will analyze how the scandal surrounding Klesmer’s
marriage to Catherine, the daughter of  Mrs. Arrowpoint, draws on
Goethe’s play about Tasso’s breach of  social proprieties. The drama
(Ein Schauspiel, in Goethe’s words) Torquato Tasso focuses on two
conceptions of  art: one sees the arts as a means of  reinforcing class
status, whereas the other questions this conception of aesthetics as con-
forming to various social, economic, and ethnic hierarchies. Goethe’s
Tasso emphasizes the nonhierarchical nature of  artistic work. On this
view art establishes the interdependence of  human difference, be
it in terms of  class, ethnicity, or gender. Goethe thus endows Tasso
with a Spinozist poetics: poetry (and, by implication, other forms of
creativity) exempliﬁes human interconnectedness. The aesthetic realm
thus illustrates Spinoza’s dictum that “man is a God to man” (hominem
homini deum esse).43
In her translation of  Ludwig Feuerbach’s The Essence of Christianity
(1854), Eliot employs a phrase similar to Spinoza’s “hominem homini
deum esse.” Here, however, the focus is on suffering rather than on
Spinozist joy in the preservation of  life: “Nothing else than this: to
42. The speciﬁc allusions to Goethe’s Tasso and his Iphigenie auf Tauris are not, how-
ever, the only textual references to the literature of  Weimar Classicism. For example,
Mrs. Meyrick’s daughter Mab discusses the biblical Book of  Revelations in the light of
Schiller’s Ode to Joy: “Call it a chapter in Revelations,” Mab explains to her mother,
“It makes me sorry for everybody. It makes me like Schiller—I want to take the world
in my arms and kiss it” (Deronda, 198). Mab is paraphrasing Schiller’s Ode to Joy: “Seid
umschlungen Millionen! / Diesen Kuss der ganzen Welt!” (“Be embraced, you millions /
I give this kiss to the whole world!”) (Friedrich Schiller, Werke, vol. 1, ed. Gerhard
Fricke and Herbert G. Goepfert [Munich: Hanser, 1980], 133). On this view Schiller’s
poetry thus outlines an inclusive universalism.
43. Spinoza, Ethics, 133, and his Opera, vol. 2, ed. Carl Gebhardt (Heidelberg: Winter,
1925), 234.
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suffer for others is divine; he who suffers for others, who lays down
his life for them, acts divinely, is a God to men.”44 Goethe’s play Tasso
depicts this kind of suffering: the poet Tasso suffers on account of social
hierarchies, but he also alleviates suffering through the composition
of  poetry. Tasso primarily remedies his suffering through his creative
work, and yet his creative work, has a social aspect because it aims
to assist its audience in the difﬁculties they may encounter in their
lives. Poetry represents a divinely human gift to remedy injustice and
inequality.
The Tasso motive of  the novel therefore connects Deronda’s non-
judgmental approach to the all-pervasive theme that centers on issues
of loss and gain. But Eliot reworks central elements of Goethe’s drama
Tasso. In what follows I analyze how a subplot in Daniel Deronda inverts
the tragic outcome of Goethe’s play about the Italian Renaissance poet.
In Goethe’s drama, Tasso commits a faux pas by giving the impres-
sion of proposing to marry Leonora, the sister of the Duke of Ferrara.
Why does this accusation pave the way to his social death? In propos-
ing to Leonora, Tasso violates the feudal hierarchy that governs his
society. He thus deﬁles the court that has employed him as a literary
servant. In Goethe’s play, Tasso often articulates his discontent with
his position. In this way he compares his life to that of  a prisoner. By
contrast, poetry represents to him a signifying space free of  the social
hierarchy.
In an important subplot within Daniel Deronda, Eliot deftly rearranges
the story line of  Goethe’s play: she focuses attention on the theme of
gain and loss. It is this promise of  gain that infuses the social order
with a quasi-libidinal aura. In Eliot’s account, however, gain loses its
appeal. In the main plot of  the novel the prospect of  success sets free
libidinal energy. This energy dissipates itself  in the construction of  a
fantasy. The fantasy in question here confers meaning on a life that
triumphs over those who have failed socially and ﬁnancially. A case in
point is of  course Gwendolen. Her story illustrates the quasi-erotic
appeal of gain: she marries in order to advance socially and ﬁnancially.
Crucially, the subplot that inverts Tasso’s tragic violation of  the social
order depicts libidinal attachment as rupture with the social hier-
archy, dividing those who gain from those who lose. The Tasso motive
is crucial because it offers a striking contrast to Klesmer and his
beloved’s break with the social order. The daughter of  the wealthy and
would-be aristocratic Mrs. Arrowpoint marries the musician Klesmer
44. Ludwig Feuerbach, The Essence of Christianity, trans. Marian Evans, 2nd ed.
(London: Trübner, 1881), 60.
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(employed by her mother in a way similar to Tasso’s position as liter-
ary servant at court) and thus loses her social and ﬁnancial position—
she abandons her heritage. The Klesmer couple thus reinterprets loss
as gain. In doing so, it enacts Tasso’s critique of  the social order that
gives consistency and quasi-libidinal appeal to various constructions of
social hierarchy.
The Klesmer couple offers a striking contrast to Gwendolen’s
marriage. For Gwendolen, hierarchy imbues everyday life with an air
of  excitement. This is so because a hierarchical structure holds out
the promise of  gain. Here she can prove her superiority. Life as such
is dull. It only becomes stimulating in the moment of  triumph. True,
both the market and the gambling hall seem to disregard class, ethnic,
and gender differences. This state of  equality is deceptive, however.
Gambling establishes an equal playing ﬁeld in order to test the strong
pleasures of  its participants: “Those who were taking their pleasure
at a higher strength, and were absorbed in play, showed very distant
varieties of  European type: Livonian and Spanish, Graeco-Italian and
miscellaneous German, English aristocratic and English plebeian. Here
certainly was a striking admission of  human equality” (8). This con-
cession to egalitarianism gives way to the agonistic principle of  gain
and loss.
Ironically, gambling does not establish Gwendolen’s superiority;
rather, it causes the loss of  her necklace. Deronda sees the irony, but
he does not judge her. On the contrary he assists her by redeeming
her necklace (330). His nonhierarchical perception of  reality is such
that he does not condemn those who participate in the hierarchy of
the gain-loss formula. The novel narrates how those who lose are in
fact those who desire gain. Gwendolen’s gambling disaster, on a micro-
cosmic level, foreshadows the loss of her family fortune due to market
speculation. Mrs. Davilow explains this state of  affairs to Gwendolen.
Mr. Lassmann, who dissipated the wealth of  the family on the market,
actually meant to increase it. Gwendolen, however, accuses Lassmann
of  theft; to which Mrs. Davilow replies, “No, dear, you don’t under-
stand. There were great speculations: he meant to gain. It was all about
mines and things of  this sort. He risked too much” (233). Wished-for
gain thus leads to loss.
Gwendolen does not learn the true nature of  the relation between
gain and loss. She remains ignorant, and her ignorance ultimately
causes her tragedy. She succumbs to a tragic blindness. As the epi-
graph to chapter 21 makes clear, her will to power is the offspring of
ignorance (“who having a practiced vision may not see that ignorance
of  the true bond between events, and false conceit of  means whereby
sequences may be compelled—like that falsity of  eyesight which
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overlooks the gradations of  distance, seeing that which is afar off  as
if  it were within a step or a grasp—precipitates the mistaken soul on
destruction?” [227]). Yet her marriage to Mr. Grandcourt seems to
enable her to scale the hierarchical ladder that promises a ﬁrm grasp
of  social prestige and signiﬁcance. Her attainment of  power is thus
the outcome of  not knowledge but ignorance. In this way, the epi-
graph to chapter 21 poses the question as to the entanglement of
power with powerlessness: “It is a common sentence that Knowledge
is power; but who hath duly considered or set forth the power of  ig-
norance?” (227). The power of  ignorance is precisely the enticement
of  ideology. Gwendolen attempts to establish a position of  inﬂuence
not knowing that this quest for supremacy will make her powerless.
The ruin of  her family fortunes makes her “taste the bitterness of
insigniﬁcance” (292). Her marriage to the wealthy and inﬂuential
Mr. Grandcourt seems to offer a way out of  social and economic
obscurity. Grandcourt’s name encapsulates the hierarchical nature of
his life. Yet this court will imprison Gwendolen. She pays scant atten-
tion to the fact that the gain-loss relation not only determines the eco-
nomic and ethnic spheres of  social hierarchy but also shapes gender
relations. This is why, as a woman, she cannot gain through marriage.
Her economic and social gain is thus bound to turn out a loss.
Here the gain-loss theme connects Gwendolen to the Jewish strand
of  the novel. Both Jews and women are deﬁned by a loss of  action.
The epigraph to chapter 51 describes the Greek poetess Erinna as
emblematic of  the gender hierarchies within society:
Erinna is condemned
To Spin the byssus drearily
In insect-labour, while the throng
Of Gods and men wrought deeds that poets wrought in song.
(624)
In chapter 42 Mordecai differentiates the Greek from the Jewish
people along lines that separate activity from passivity. Gentile
children “admire the bravery of  those who fought foremost at Mara-
thon. . . . But the Jew has no memory that binds him to action” (529).
Gwendolen attempts to gain room for action through her marriage
to Grandcourt. She marries in order to obtain “rank and luxuries”
(669), and yet the court of  her married life turns out to be a gilded
prison.
She has “no choice but to endure insigniﬁcance and servitude” (315).
The reference to insigniﬁcance and servitude has a parallel in Goethe’s
Tasso. This parallel has a rather ironic bearing on Gwendolen’s ignorant
gain-loss calculation. In Goethe’s play Tasso frequently characterizes
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himself  as being conﬁned to a state of  servitude as the subject of
Alfons II, Duke of  Ferrara. In a subplot that connects the novel’s
Jewish and English strands, a reversal of  Tasso’s tragedy takes place
that starkly contrasts with the misery of  Gwendolen’s marriage.
Here the heroine and the hero perceive the unity of  binary oppo-
sites. They forsake the gain of  family fortune and thus avoid the
tragedy of  loss.45 In this subplot the German-Jewish musician ﬁgures
as a modern reincarnation of Goethe’s Tasso. He marries the daughter
of Mrs. Arrowpoint. Mrs. Arrowpoint tells Gwendolen of her intention
to write a book about Tasso. “So many,” she declares, “have written
about Tasso, but they are all wrong.” She goes on to comment on the
theme of  madness, imprisonment and marriage: “As to the particular
nature of  his [i.e., Tasso’s] madness, his feelings for Leonora, and the
real cause of  his imprisonment, and the character of  Leonora, who,
in my opinion is a cold-hearted woman, else she would have married
him in spite of  her brother, they are all wrong. I differ from every-
body” (46). Ironically, the subplot of  her daughter’s love affair—rather
than Mrs. Arrowpoint’s book project—differs from the main plot of
Goethe’s Tasso. In the novel, Mrs. Arrowpoint in fact plays the role of
Leonora’s brother: she interdicts her daughter’s marriage to Klesmer.
In the play the Italian poet stands condemned for his breach of  social
propriety. He breaks social hierarchies when he seems to propose to
Leonora, the sister of the Duke of Ferrara. Mrs. Arrowpoint’s daughter,
by contrast, marries the German-Jewish artist. In so doing she severely
disappoints her mother, who wants her to marry Mr. Grandcourt.
This marriage designates gain, whereas the union with Klesmer
amounts to a loss of  social and economic power. Mrs. Arrowpoint cas-
tigates her daughter Catherine for her intention to become the ﬁancée
of  the German-Jewish musician: “You will be a public fable. Every one
will say that you must have made the offer to a man who has been
paid to come to the house—who is nobody knows what—a gypsy, a
Jew, a mere bubble of  the earth” (246). In response to this onslaught
Catherine evokes the genius of  Tasso: “Never mind, mamma. . . . We
know he [i.e., Klesmer] is a genius—as Tasso was” (246). Mrs. Arrow-
point then reminds her daughter that it is “a woman’s duty not to lower
herself” (247). Catherine abandons her position within the hierarchical
45. Esther in Felix Holt offers an intriguing comparison to this embrace of loss. After
having rejected Harold Transome’s marriage proposal and after having married the
destitute Felix Holt, Esther gains prominence as someone who “had renounced wealth,
and chosen to be the wife of  a man who said he would always be poor” (George Eliot,
Felix Holt, the Radical, ed. William Baker and Kenneth Womack [Peterborough: Broad-
view, 2000], 505).
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gradation that shapes Victorian society. She marries Klesmer, and
her parents disinherit her. Is her loss really a loss? Unlike Goethe’s
play, Catherine and Klesmer’s story does not end in dramatic upheaval.
How does it accomplish this feat of  an ordinary ending?
The Klesmer couple conﬁgures gain as a loss. They willingly aban-
don the family fortune of  the Arrowpoints as if  it were a poisonous
appendage. In doing so they give themselves the “pure gift,” which in
Derrida’s words,
should have the generosity to give nothing that surprises and appears 
as gift, nothing that presents itself as present, nothing that is; it should 
therefore be surprising enough and so thoroughly made up of  a 
surprise that is not even a question of  getting over it, thus of  a surprise 
surprising enough to let itself  be forgotten without delay. And at stake 
in this forgetting that carries beyond any present is the gift as 
remaining [restance] without memory, without permanence and 
consistency, without substance or subsistence; at stake is this rest that 
is, without being (it), beyond Being, epekeina tes ousias.46
By foregoing the gift of  inheritance, the Klesmer couple has reached
the state that Derrida has thus characterized as the “pure gift.” When
Mrs. Arrowpoint draws a line in the sand by making it clear that the
marriage would disinherit her daughter, Klesmer responds by con-
ﬂating fortune with misfortune: “Madam, her fortune has been the only
thing I have had to regret about her” (248). The couple thus abdicates
any relation to the loss-gain formula that holds Gwendolen in its grip.
The reversal of  Tasso’s tragic violation of  social proprieties in the
Klesmer subplot starkly contrasts with the main narrative account of
Gwendolen’s marriage to Grandcourt: here, too, the inheritance of  a
gift plays a signiﬁcant role. Whereas the Klesmer couple freely rejects
the passing on of  the Arrowpoint family fortune, the already married
Gwendolen is in no position to return the gift of Grandcourt’s former
mistress Mrs. Glasher. On the day of her marriage to Mr. Grandcourt,
Mrs. Glasher has a couple of  valuable diamonds delivered to Gwen-
dolen. These diamonds were Grandcourt’s gift of  love to his former
mistress. They represent gain. Here, however, the gift is poisonous. The
inheritance of  the diamonds is deeply fraught: “It was as if  an adder
had lain on them” (358). They embody what Derrida has described as
the constitutive feature of  a pharmakon: they exemplify a gift that is a
curse.47
46. Jacques Derrida, Given Time: I. Counterfeit Money, trans. Peggy Kamuf  (University
of  Chicago Press, 1994), 147.
47. See Jacques Derrida’s Dissemination, trans. Barbara Johnson (University of Chicago
Press, 1981), 63–171.
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The narrator dwells on the lethal residue of inheritance: “Truly here
were poisonous germs and the poison had entered into this poor
young creature” (359). In a “spell-bound” state Gwendolen reads Lydia
Glasher’s letter and “suddenly” gives in to “a new spasm of  terror.”
When Grandcourt sees her in this disposition, he wonders whether
this is “a ﬁt of  madness” (359). Such dementia does not take hold of
Klesmer. Klesmer and Catherine walk in the footsteps of  the Italian
poet when they denounce the hierarchical code that dictates the proper
marriage arrangement for high-ranking women. Why does their plot
nevertheless contrast with that of  Tasso (and by implication that of
Gwendolen)? They not only threaten but enact a break with societal
stratiﬁcations, whereas Tasso, as Goethe’s play repeatedly emphasizes,
lacks room for action. Tasso lives in a state of  servitude where action
is prohibited (“Das Handeln bleibt mir untersagt”).48 Conversely,
Gwendolen marries in order to gain socially as well as economically.
As result of  a marriage arrangement, she falls prey to something re-
sembling madness (if  only temporarily).
Most important, the ﬁt of dementia takes place at precisely the point
where the opposition between gain and loss disintegrates into a state
of  coincidence: the one who gains loses. When Gwendolen dimly per-
ceives the emptiness of gain, the meanings of the social order that has
sustained her sense of  reality collapse. A void opens up. This empti-
ness results from the momentary sight of  the now apparent gulf  that
divides the signiﬁer (gain) from the signiﬁed (which turns out to be
loss).
As Jacques Lacan has extensively discussed, normal psychological
functions depend on the quilting point where signiﬁer and signiﬁed
are knotted together.49 The ends of  this point have been tenuously
sewn together at the moment when the copiousness of meaning, which
the signiﬁer potentially signiﬁes, has been reduced to and ﬁrmly iden-
tiﬁed with one speciﬁc signiﬁed. When experience contradicts this
identiﬁcation (as is the case when gain turns out to be loss), the quilting
point breaks asunder. This is precisely the case at the moment and
place (Mr. Grandcourt’s luxurious mansion) where Gwendolen realizes
that Mrs. Glasher’s gift is poisonous. She dimly recognizes then that
the sign “gain” has such a superabundance of  meaning that it can in
fact announce the opposite of  the only signiﬁcance the subject has so
far invested in it.
48. Goethe, Torquato Tasso 4.3.2549, in his Werke, vol. 5, ed. Erich Trunz (Noerdlingen:
Beck, 1989).
49. See Jacques Lacan, The Psychoses: The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, ed. Jacques-Alain
Miller, book 3, 1955–1956, trans. Russell Grigg (London: Routledge, 1993), 268–323.
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Gwendolen manages to come to terms with reality by suppress-
ing this recognition. She thus does not completely identify with the
unscrupulousness implicit in the pursuit of  personal gain, as repre-
sented by her ﬁnancier husband Grandcourt. Instead, she appeases her
scruples by focusing her attention on Deronda as someone who, she
imagines, calls into question that which she nevertheless does (namely,
marrying Grandcourt in order to advance socially and ﬁnancially).50
This then is her unknown known: the desire for supremacy causes
the experience of  failure. It is precisely this overlap between gain and
loss that Klesmer, as a truly fortunate modern-day Tasso, announces
when he depicts his ﬁancée’s inheritance as a poisonous burden.
I V.  G O E T H E ’ S  I P H I G E N I E  A N D  T H E
E Q U A L I T Y  O F  A T H E N S  A N D  J E R U S A L E M
In her revision of  the Tasso motif, Eliot introduces the element of
ethnic tension. As we have seen, Mrs. Arrowpoint takes exception to
Klesmer’s ethnic background. Goethe’s play, by contrast, exclusively
focuses on the Italian poet’s presumed violation of  the hierarchical
social code that governs marriage arrangements. But Gillian Beer has
pointed out that these two spheres were closely interlinked with each
other in Victorian writing and thought: “The fascination with race is
for many Victorian writers essentially a fascination with class. Race and
class raise the same questions of  descent, genealogy, nobility, the pos-
sibility of  development and transformation.”51
The novel alludes to another of  Goethe’s Weimar plays, one which
revolves around the contrast between different ethnic communities.
This section focuses on allusions to Goethe’s Iphigenie in the context
of  Mirah’s relation to her brother. The intertextual references to
Goethe’s Tasso and his Iphigenie connect the novel’s English with its
Jewish strand. Both foreground the theme of  loss and gain. It is this
theme that unites the seemingly piecemeal aspects of  the novel. Inter-
textual references are not ends in themselves in Daniel Deronda.
Rather, they bring to the fore Eliot’s criticism of  a narrow conception
50. As Slavoj Zizek has pointed out, this refusal to identify with a given ideological
position paradoxically helps the enactment of  ideology: “An ideological identiﬁcation
exerts a true hold on us precisely when we maintain an awareness that we are not fully
identical to it, that there is a rich person beneath it: ‘not all is ideology, beneath the
ideological mask, I am also a human person’ is the very form of ideology, of  its ‘practical
efﬁciency’ ” (Zizek, The Plague of Fantasies [London: Verso, 1997], 21).
51. Beer, Darwin’s Plot, 189.
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of national identity.52 They instantiate the novel’s intrinsic connection
with world literature, delineating “the way in which cultures recognize
themselves through their projections of  ‘otherness.’ ”53 The allusions
to both Jewish history and the literature of Weimar Classicism connect
the novel to transnational literature. Homi K. Bhabha has described
transnational writing as follows: “Where, once, the transmission of
national traditions was the major theme of a world literature, perhaps
we can now suggest that transnational histories of  migrants, the colo-
nized, or political refugees—these border and frontier conditions—may
be the terrain of  world literature.”54 Strikingly, in his reformulation
of  the meaning of  world literature, Bhabha recuperates Goethe’s con-
ception of  the term.55 Eliot’s allusion to two plays by Goethe seems
to have a programmatic character, evoking a sense of  cultural inter-
connectedness. Eliot’s literary allusions question the validity of national
boundaries, foregrounding the isomorphism of  self  and other.
So I read Eliot’s allusions to another Goethe work. In a more pro-
nounced manner than in Tasso, in Iphigenie auf Tauris Goethe puts on
stage the deleterious divide between the civilized and the barbarian.
By alluding to Goethe’s reworking of  Euripides’ play, Eliot moves the
supposed contrast between gentile and Jew into a wider historical and
cultural context. This has an important bearing on Mordecai’s Spinozist
quest for the formation of a particular identity that does not contradict
universalism. He is particularly concerned with redressing the priori-
tization of  the Hellenistic heritage over Jewish history. His endeavor
to establish equilibrium between different cultural formations mirrors
Klesmer’s disregard of hierarchical constructions within the social and
the economic spheres. By comparing Mordecai’s relation with Mirah
to that of  Iphigenia and Orestes, Deronda implicitly puts the Greek
and the Jewish worlds on a par with each other.
52. The foregrounding of  these intertextual references contributes to the sense of
artistic construction. As Nurbhai and Newton have recently pointed out, it this sense
of  the imaginary that distinguishes Eliot’s last novel from ﬁction composed in a realist
mode: “What distinguishes Eliot from such writers [as John Buchan and Kipling] is the
awareness in her Jewish novel that any literary representation of  Jews will be a con-
struction. The novel itself  is preoccupied with construction. Deronda constructs his own
identity as a Jew and Eliot foregrounds her own literary construction by, for example,
creating a polarized relationship between Deronda as Noble Jew and Lapidoth as Evil
Jew that functions allegorically” (Nurbhai and Newton, George Eliot, Judaism and the
Novels, 20).
53. Homi K. Bhabha, The Location of Culture (London: Routledge, 1994), 12.
54. Ibid.
55. See John Pizer’s “Goethe’s ‘World Literature’ Paradigm and Contemporary Cul-
tural Globalization,” Comparative Literature 52 (2000): 213–27.
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In his revision of  Euripides’ Iphigenie, Goethe shifts the emphasis
away from the relation between gods and men to a concern with inter-
cultural conﬂict. Whereas in Euripides the deity Artemis asks for
human sacriﬁces, Goethe turns this sacriﬁcial aspect into the main
social trait that distinguishes the barbarism of  the Taureans from the
civilization of the Greeks. Yet the play questions the social and cultural
validity of a binary opposition between the civilized and the primitive.
Speciﬁcally, the second scene of  the play presents a conversation
between Agamemnon’s daughter and Arkas, a messenger of  the king
of  Tauris. In this dialogue Iphigenia conceives of  the foreign as the
familiar. Here she implicitly alludes to the violence inherent in her
own Greek family history (namely, the curse of Atreus). In this way, she
comes to understand the barbarism that forms part of  her “civilized”
home.
Thoas, the King of  Tauris, confronts Iphigenia with the history of
violence that pertains to her own Greek background.56 Goethe’s and,
by implication, Herder’s notion of  Humanität eludes the binary oppo-
sition between civilization and barbarism. Hierarchical rankings of
culture result in the perpetration of  violence. They are attempts to
obfuscate humanity’s common debt to nature. The “other” appears
in the light of  the nonhuman, be it the natural (revealingly, primitive
people are called Naturvölker in German) or the animalistic. As Adorno
astutely observes in his famous essay, “Zum Klassizismus von Goethes
Iphigenie” (On the Classicism of  Goethe’s Iphigenie), “Iphigenia nego-
tiates the notion of humanity out of the experience of its antinomy.”57
In Tauris the homely appears to be strange.
When her brother Orestes arrives on the island ( just having killed
his mother Clytemnestra), he tries to persuade his sister to escape
with him without saying goodbye to Thoas. The play here questions
the enlightenment’s self-understanding as civilization. As Adorno has
put it, “by dint of  his antithesis to myth Orestes threatens to fall prey
to it.”58 The play centers on Iphigenia’s refusal to treat “the barbarian”
in a humiliating manner. She informs Thoas of  her intention to leave
Tauris together with her brother. This news enrages Thoas. Iphigenia’s
sense of grace, however, soothes him, and he allows her to set sail with
Orestes for her Greek homeland.59
56. See Goethe, Iphigenie auf Tauris 5.3.1937–43, in Goethe’s Werke: Band V; Drama-
tische Dichtungen III, ed. Erich Trunz (Munich: Beck, 1989).
57. “Humanität wird in der Iphigenie verhandelt aus der Erfahrung ihrer Antinomie
heraus” (Theodor W. Adorno, Noten zur Literatur: Gesammelte Schriften Band 11, ed. Rolf
Tiedemann [Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1998], 500).
58. Ibid., 512.
59. See Goethe, Iphigenie auf Tauris 5.3.1983–91.
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In the closing dialogue of  the play, Iphigenia does not celebrate the
Enlightenment notion of  tolerance. Instead, she argues that it is the
practice of  hospitality that bridges ethnic divisions and conﬂicts. This
ﬁnal dialogue brings closure to a drama that attempts to renegotiate
the meaning of the terms “civilized” and “barbarous.” Why does Goethe
avoid the Enlightenment term “tolerance”? As Derrida has recently
pointed out, the “word ‘tolerance’ is ﬁrst of  all marked by a religious
war between Christians, or between Christians and non-Christians.”60
Most important, this concept introduces a hierarchical divide between
those who are tolerant and those who are tolerated.
This is why Derrida prefers the notion of  hospitality to that of
tolerance. The former engages with the foreign from within a non-
hierarchical context, while the latter only refrains from the physical
extinction of  what appears to be strange or alien:
But tolerance remains scrutinized hospitality, always under 
surveillance, parsimonious and protective of  its sovereignty. . . . We 
offer hospitality only on the condition that the other follows our rules, 
our way of  life, even our language, our culture, our political system, 
and so on. That is hospitality as it is commonly understood and 
practiced, a hospitality that gives rise, with certain conditions, to 
regulated practices, laws, and conventions on a national and 
international—indeed, as Kant says in a famous text, a “cosmopolitan”—
scale. . . . Pure and unconditional hospitality, hospitality itself, opens or 
is in advance open to someone who is neither expected nor invited, to 
whomever arrives as an absolutely foreign visitor, as a new arrival, 
nonidentiﬁable and unforeseeable, in short, wholly other. I would call 
this a hospitality of  visitation rather than invitation.61
Derrida takes issue with the implicit hierarchical gradation that
“tolerance,” as “scrutinized” hospitality, establishes between those
who invite and those who are invited. An invitation unfolds accord-
ing to “regulated practices, laws, and conventions.” Iphigenia, by con-
trast, undergoes what Derrida calls a visitation while enjoying Thoas’s
hospitality. She realizes that her Greek standard of  civilization fails to
establish her superiority if  confronted with the assumed barbarism
of  Tauris. Iphigenia thus recognizes how civilization is sustained by
the copresence of  its fantasized other: how barbarism always already
exists on equal terms with the civilized aspirations of  Greek culture.
This collapse of  binary oppositions is not conﬁned to the supposedly
60. Jacques Derrida, quoted in Giovanna Borradori, Philosophy in a Time of Terror:
Dialogues with Jürgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida (University of  Chicago Press,
2003), 126.
61. Ibid., 128–29.
M O D E R N  P H I L O L O G Y692
self-referential realm of  language. It has social consequences because
it confounds the hierarchical construction of  what it means to be
Greek (civilized) or non-Greek (barbarian).
In her closing dialogue with Thoas, Iphigenia does not engage in
a legal or political discourse. Rather, she depicts the prospect of  a
future interaction between the homely and the strange that unfolds
via visitation rather than invitation. A “friendly hospitality” (freundlich
Gastrecht) will bridge the gulf  between different cultural communities.
The different thus remains different but is no longer separated from
that which seemingly opposes it. Now disconnected difference becomes
familiar. Signiﬁcantly, Iphigenia includes Thoas in her family. At the
end of  the play, she emphasizes that his difference has in fact entered
her family home, and she no longer considers his strangeness in a
detached political manner (what Derrida calls “sovereignty” in the
quote above) as a separated sphere of  existence. Even though he is
not related to her family, Iphigenia admits him into her kinship
group. This becomes abundantly clear when she calls him “father”:
Ein freundlich Gastrecht walte
Von dir zu uns, so sind wir nicht auf  ewig
Getrennt und abgeschieden. Wert und teuer
Wie mein Vater war, so bist Du’s mir,
Und dieser Eindruck bleibt in meiner Seele.
[A friendly hospitality prevailes / between us (moving from you to us), 
so that we are not eternally / separated and cut off. Valuable and dear / 
As my father was, so you are to me, / and this impression will remain in 
my soul.]62
Hospitality denaturalizes geographic and cultural separation. Signiﬁ-
cantly, Iphigenia does not depict the Greeks as initiators of this cordial
relationship. Rather, the “friendly hospitality” of  which she speaks
traces the itinerary of  a visitation: it moves from to Tauris to Greece
(“Von dir zu uns”). It literally arrives on Greek shores as a visitor.
The intertextual reference to Goethe’s drama about Iphigenia is sig-
niﬁcant for a new understanding of Eliot’s Daniel Deronda. In this con-
text, it is worth inspecting the points where allusions to the Iphigenia
motif  occur in the novel. Long before Deronda discovers that he is a
Jew, he compares the Jewish plot of the novel to Greek myth. The spe-
ciﬁc myth is that of Orestes and Iphigenia: he associates Mirah’s search
for her brother with that of  Orestes for his lost sister. “To Deronda
this event of  ﬁnding Mirah was as heart-stirring as anything that
62. Goethe, Iphigenie auf Tauris 5.3.2154–57. The translation is mine.
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befell Orestes or Rinaldo” (205). Against the conventions of  his time,
Deronda puts the Jewish and the classical/Christian worlds (Rinaldo’s
Crusade context is depicted in Tasso’s Gerusalemme liberata) on a par
with each other. Nineteenth-century anti-Semitism equated the Jews
with the barbarians and contrasted them with the civilized Greeks.
Deronda, by contrast, shows as much empathy for the life of  contem-
porary Jewry as he does for the texts and artifacts of  ancient Greece:
“Deronda had as reverential an interest in Mordecai and Mirah as he
could have had in the offspring of Agamemnon” (544). In an intriguing
parallel to Goethe’s play Iphigenie auf Tauris, Deronda is not Mirah’s
kin, just as the “barbarian” Thoas is not Iphigenia’s father, but
Deronda nevertheless becomes accepted as a proper father ﬁgure.
(Agamemnon, Iphigenia’s biological father, famously set out to sacri-
ﬁce his daughter; Artemis saves the latter and transports her to Tauris
where, in Goethe’s account, Thoas acts like a true father.) In this way
the allusions to Goethe’s play relate Jews (perceived as “barbarians”)
to the Greeks. Through a creative reworking of  Goethe’s play, Jews
are associated with the Greeks while almost celebrating the difference.
The Jewish past becomes as relevant as the Greek past in Eliot’s oeuvre.
The redemption of  the Jewish past was a burning question for
various Jewish writers and thinkers in the nineteenth century. Leopold
Zunz, who, together with the poet Heinrich Heine, was one of  the
active members of  the Wissenschaft des Judentums (Society for the
Culture and Science of  the Jews), strongly believed that anti-Semitism
and assimilation would ring in the end of  Jewish history.63 Zunz em-
barked on historiographical research in order to give Judaism “a dig-
niﬁed burial.”64 With his thorough scholarly work, he set out to rescue
the future remembrance of  Jewish history. Eliot highlights this state
of  affairs when she cites a key passage from Zunz’s Die Synagogale
Poesie des Mittelalters as the epigraph for chapter 42:
Wenn es eine Stufenleiter von Leiden gibt, so hat Israel die höchste 
Staffel erstiegen; wenn die Dauer der Schmerzen und die Geduld, mit 
welcher sie ertragen werden, adeln, no nehmen es die Juden mit den 
Hochgeborenen aller Länder auf; wenn eine Literatur reich genannt 
wird, die wenige klassische Trauerspiele besitzt, welcher Platz gebührt 
dann einer Tragödie die anderthalb Jahrtausende währt, gedichtet und 
dargestellt von den Helden selber?
63. For a detailed discussion of  Leopold Zunz and the Wissenschaft des Judentums,
see Paul Mendes-Flohr and Jehuda Reinharz, The Jew in the Modern World (Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 1995), 207–40.
64. I am indebted to long-standing discussion with Paul Mendes-Flohr (University of
Chicago and Hebrew University, Jerusalem) about all this. See Mendes-Flohr’s German
Jews: A Dual Identity (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1999).
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If  there are ranks in suffering, Israel takes precedence of  all the 
nations—if  the duration of  sorrows and the patience with which they 
are borne ennoble, the Jews are among the aristocracy of  every land—if  
a literature is called rich in the possession of  few classic tragedies, what 
shall we say to a National Tragedy lasting for ﬁfteen hundred years, in 
which the poets and the actors were also the heroes? (517)
This quote is more than a cri de coeur: it goes to the heart of  the
contrast between Jew and Greek that structures the novel’s Iphigenia
theme. Zunz depicts Jewish history in aristocratic terms by relating it
to the world of suffering that constitutes Greek tragedy. Jews, despised
and condemned to endure with patience centuries ﬁlled with pain,
exist in a state of  abjection equivalent to that of  the ancient Greeks,
who epitomize nobility. Here loss clearly becomes gain.
According to Zunz, the derided Jews outdo the revered Greeks in
Greekness: whereas the Greeks only composed a few tragedies, Jewish
history constitutes a tragedy that reaches from the contemporary age
back to the mythic time of  the Hebrew Bible. The whole history of
the Jews therefore represents the work of  art, which can only frag-
mentarily be found in Greek tragedies. The demoted life of  the Jews,
in actual fact, presents (“gedichtet und dargestellt von den Helden
selber”) that of  which the writings and artifacts of  ancient Greece are
only fantasized representations.
This quotation from Zunz’s Die Synagogale Poesie des Mittelalters intro-
duces a chapter in which the relation between Greek and Jew (Iphigenia
and Mirah) moves into a Spinozist context. Mordecai, whom Deronda
previously compared to Iphigenia’s brother Orestes, here engages in
a discussion about the Jewish past at the pub, The Hand and Banner,
which is the regular meeting place of  the club “The Philosophers.” In
this philosophical society, Mordecai discusses Spinoza’s work within
the context of  afﬁliations and disafﬁliations with the Jewish past:
Baruch Spinoza had not a faithful Jewish heart, though he had sucked 
the life of  his intellect at the breasts of  Jewish tradition. He laid bare his 
father’s nakedness and said, “They who scorn him have the higher 
wisdom.” Yet Baruch Spinoza confessed, he saw not why Israel should 
not again be a chosen nation. Who says that the history of  and literature 
of  our race are dead? Are they not as living as the history and literature 
of  Greece and Rome, which have inspired revolutions, enkindled the 
thought of  Europe, and made the unrighteous powers tremble? These 
were an inheritance dug from the tomb. Ours is an inheritance that has 
never ceased to quiver in millions of  human frames. (536)
In the ﬁrst part of  his statement, Mordecai refers to Spinoza’s heresy:
he compares the seventeenth-century philosopher to the biblical
Ham who uncovered his father Noah. Yet the herem (ban), which the
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Sephardic Jewish community of  Amsterdam imposed upon Spinoza,
did not result in a complete disafﬁliation with Jewish history. In the
Theological-Political Treatise, Spinoza nurtures the possibility that the
Jews will “establish once more their independent state, and that God
will again choose them.”65 Mordecai, who characterizes Spinoza as a
rationalist philosopher, argues that Enlightenment thought does not
necessarily demote the past to insigniﬁcance. At this point it becomes
apparent why Eliot translates the term “Tragödie,” which Zunz employs
to describe Jewish history, as a “National Tragedy.” As has been inti-
mated above, Zunz did not believe in the futurity of  Jewish history.
He feared that Enlightenment thought and modern culture would do
away with Jewish difference. Mordecai, by contrast, argues for the com-
patibility between cultural/religious difference and the rationality of
an enlightened philosopher such as Spinoza.
Here the term “nation” denotes not the homogenous but the diverse.
Modernity cannot do without particularity (that is, national identities)
if  it wants to avoid the homogeneity of a monolithic state, which would
of course in itself  be an unacknowledged particular entity (as Zizek has
argued “one should fully accept the paradoxical fact that the dimension
of  universality is always sustained by the ﬁxation on some particular
point”).66 Mordecai therefore questions an understanding of  univer-
sality that obfuscates its particularity: “Can a fresh-made garment of
citizenship weave itself  straightway into the ﬂesh and change the slow
deposit of  eighteen centuries? What is the citizenship of  him who
walks among a people he has no hearty kindred and fellowship with,
and has lost the sense of brotherhood with his own race? It is a charter
of  selﬁsh ambition and rivalry in low greed” (528). The garment rep-
resents the imposition of a monolithic abstraction upon the embodied
forms of human diversity. Like Spinoza, Mordecai opts for the heretical
act of  uncovering. Both thinkers repeat Ham’s sacrilege against the
father ﬁgure: Spinoza became a heretic by offending the religious
orthodoxy of  his time, and in a different but related way Mordecai,
walking in the footsteps of the maverick Enlightenment thinker Herder,
introduces the open acknowledgment of  particularity into the univer-
sality of  rationalist thought.
How does particularity manifest itself? According to Mordecai, it
denotes the vitality of  the past within the changed context of  the
present. This survival of  the past within the here and now deﬁnes
Jewish history. Gentile society reveres the ancient Greeks precisely
because they are dead (“were an inheritance dug from the tomb”),
65. Spinoza, Theological-Political Treatise, 47.
66. Zizek, Plague of Fantasies, 104.
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and it despises the Jews on account of their persistence. Anti-Semitism
gives rise to a fantasy of  life that cannot be put to death, that is so
ﬁlled with enjoyment that its vitality constantly renews itself. This
then is the supposed threat of  the Jews: life that does not need to fear
death.67 Mordecai emphasizes this phantasmagoria of  unquenchable
life that spurs anti-Semitism: “Ours is an inheritance that has never
ceased to quiver in millions of  human frames.” This contrast between
ancient Greeks as inhabitants of the tomb and Jews as bearers of eternal
life has a point of  reference in the historiography of  Heinreich Graetz.
Between 1853 and 1870 Graetz set out to counter anti-Semitism as
well as to revive a sense of  Jewish identity by writing a multivolume
History of the Jews from biblical times to contemporary Europe. In the
concluding volume of  this truly monumental work, Graetz gives an
etiology of  anti-Semitism. Here he formulates the contrast between
death (ancient Greece as adored in present-day German culture) and
eternal life (the survival of  the Jews), which Eliot’s Mordecai implic-
itly picks up in his speech about Spinoza and the redemption of  the
past within the present (Eliot was of  course familiar with Graetz’s
magnum opus). Graetz asks his readers how we can account for the
fact that modern German culture discriminates against Jewish civili-
zation and lavishes praise on Greek and Roman antiquity. Like Eliot’s
Mordecai, he explains this discrepancy with reference to the presence
of an ongoing and vital Jewish culture within the contemporary world.
Rather than being praised for their cultural achievements, the Jews
are discriminated against precisely because they, unlike the ancient
Hellenes, continue to exist.68
As a result of  their continued existence, the Jews are perceived as a
threat: “Jaundiced malignity and hatred are silent at the grave of  the
illustrious man; his merits as enumerated there are, in fact, as a rule
overrated. . . . Just because of  their continued existence, the merits
and moral attainments of  the Hebrews are not generally acknowl-
edged.”69 Mordecai develops and deepens Graetz’s critique of  both
anti-Semitism and the cult of  Hellenism when he pinpoints Jewish
survival as the stone of  offense that gives rise to all kinds of  feelings
67. For a brilliant discussion of  a similar return of  the dead in Honoré de Balzac’s Le
Colonel Chabert, see Cathy Caruth, “The Claims of the Dead: History, Haunted Property,
and the Law,” Critical Inquiry 28 (2002): 419–41.
68. For a detailed discussion of  Heinreich Graetz’s response to anti-Semitism, see
Mack, German Idealism and the Jew, 98–107.
69. Heinrich Graetz, History of the Jews, vol. 5, From the Chmielncki Persecution of the
Jews in Poland (1648 C.E.) to the Present Time (1870 C.E.), trans. Bella Löwy (Philadelphia:
Jewish Publication Society of  America, 1895), 707.
Michael Mack „ Deronda and the Literature of Weimar Classicism 697
of  envy and rivalry. Why does the continuation of  life provoke such
outbursts of hatred? The arrest of movement, that is to say, the freezing
of  a living process, establishes the decipherment of  its purported
meaning: “immobility,” as Zizek writes, “makes a thing visible.”70 The
literature and the artifacts of  ancient Greece are signiﬁcant because
they belong to a bygone civilization: their past is literally passed (in
the words of  Mordecai, it belongs to the tomb).
Ancient Jewish customs are “alive while dead”: they bridge the gulf
between the deadness of  prehistory and the palpitation that runs
through present day life (Mordecai’s “inheritance that has never ceased
to quiver in millions of  human frames”). This very paradox makes
Judaism “insigniﬁcant” in the eyes of  the English society in which
Deronda has been brought up. The past that has not been frozen but
continues to live in the present provokes anger in those who structure
their lives according to a differentiation between the contingency and
meaninglessness of  the past (be it “primitive,” “Jewish,” or “super-
stitious”) and the goal-oriented signiﬁcance of  history’s progress, of
which the current state of  affairs is, of  course, the culmination. As
Zizek has put it, “Life is the horrible palpitation of  the ‘lamella,’ the
non-subjective (‘acephalous’) undead drive which persists beyond
ordinary death; death is the symbolic order itself, the structure which,
as a parasite, colonizes the living entity.”71 By questioning the sym-
bolic order, Deronda walks in the footsteps of  Goethe’s Tasso and
Iphigenia. By putting himself  into the place of  those who have been
excluded by this order, he ﬁnds his life and his inheritance. The novel
turns the common understanding of meaning and signiﬁcance upside
down. It traverses the chain of  signiﬁcation so that the insigniﬁcant
turns into the signiﬁcant and loss reemerges as gain.
70. Zizek, Plague of Fantasies, 87.
71. Ibid., 89.
